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Common Interest Developments in Canada: Private Communities 
and the Future of Canadian Cities
Paul Hesse1
Abstract
This paper examines the phenomenon of Common Interest Developments (CIDs), more commonly known as “gated
communities”, within the Canadian context. Comparing Canadian CIDs to their US counterparts. The author notes that
Canadian developments are more likely to target seniors, tend to have fewer security features and are usually developed
on a smaller scale. The author cautions that the proliferation of CIDs may have significant implications for local
politics and Canadian cities. CID residents in the US are gaining political clout through well-organized homeowner
associations, which constitute an effective lobbying force. Such associations are increasingly advocating measures
such as tax rebates for their constituency, arguing for an end to what they call “double taxation” since CID residents
pay both municipal taxes and monthly fees to the CID. The paper argues that CIDs are exclusionary by nature, fostering
homogeneity in age, race, and income group, and that the proliferation of such development will lead to greater
segregation in Canadian cities.
Common Interest Developments in Canada
“We’re all Sandycovers!” 
Sandycove Acres, Ontario’s largest Adult Lifestyle Community, trumpets itself as “the perfect
retirement community”. In Sandycove, just outside of Barrie, Ontario, you will find that:
Peace of mind comes with knowing that the managers will maintain the community
character of Sandycove Acres just as it is today. From Architectural Control, to
upkeep of the community, to control of maintenance and operating costs, the Private
Community concept helps to ensure that Sandycove Acres will change very little over
the years. (Sandycove Acres Limited, n.d. a)
Residents aren’t just buying a home, they are buying into a planned community. This is evidently a
popular message. Since its establishment, Sandycove has been home to over 3,000 retirement-age
families (Sandycove Acres Limited, n.d. a).
Communities like Sandycove Acres are known as common interest developments (CIDs).
While every CID is different, there are common features. The appeal of communities like Sandycove
Acres comes from their privacy. In almost all the cases, the perimeter of the community is walled, and
2all residents must enter through a gate. No visitor may enter without permission and there are limits
on how long grandchildren or other visitors may stay. As friendly as the residents are, communities
like Sandycove are no place for outsiders.
Common interest developments are comparable to private governments and provide, as
exclusive rights, what have traditionally been considered basic public services. As these communities
grow and gain in political influence, the logical next step would be a movement to pay less municipal
taxes. In the United States, homeowner associations have become lobbyists calling for an end to what
they refer to as “double taxation”. American CID residents have grown tired of paying for private as
well as public services. Their solution has been to opt out. This is what Robert Reich, former
Secretary of Labor to President Clinton, calls the “secession of the successful” (Mackenzie 1994: 23).
Homeowners in CIDs have seceded from society by living behind gates and walls, and abdicated their
civic responsibility by refusing to pay for public roads and municipal services. If Canadian CIDs
follow their American counterparts, Canadian homeowner associations, too, will soon be a powerful
political force. 
Currently there is little academic work on common interest developments in Canada. Indeed,
in researching this paper, it was first necessary to determine whether CIDs exist in Canada. In fact,
they do. CIDs can be found in British Columbia and Ontario. One is being planned in Québec, just
north of Ottawa-Hull, and the City of Calgary recently rejected the plan of one developer to create a
gated community within city limits. Even in the prairies, a gated community has recently been built just
north of Winnipeg, in East St. Paul.
This paper is among the first to examine the rapidly-growing phenomenon of common interest
developments in the Canadian context. The author is heavily indebted to the groundbreaking work of
Evan McKenzie’s Privatopia, which discusses American CIDs. This paper will define CIDs and
discuss their main characteristics. A number of examples of Canadian CIDs will be described and
compared with their American counterparts. The paper will discuss the likely consequences of this
phenomenon for Canadian cities. 
CIDs have the potential to change the physical structure of Canadian municipalities, as well
as their politics. Tension between developers and their allies ! the homeowner associations ! and
local governments is unavoidable in the long run. This paper will shed light on the ill-understood
phenomenon of CIDs in Canada. 
3The History of Common Interest Developments
Common Interest Developments have existed in the United States since the mid-19th century
in the form of neighbourhoods for the privileged. Restrictive covenants limited who could live in the
neighbourhood and how houses could look. One of the first such developments was Gramercy Park
in New York City. This luxury development included private parks and lakes that were owned in
common by the residents. In 1831, the neighbourhood created an association that attached restrictive
covenants to the land and imposed private taxes for the parks’ upkeep (Mackenzie 1994: 9). The first
CIDs, such as Gramercy Park, were the exclusive domain of the wealthy. Starting in the 1960s, CIDs
have been built en masse for the middle class. Since then, CIDs have been a major American housing
phenomenon.
Beginning in the 1960’s, rising land prices and a growing population were putting pressure
on suburban developers to conserve land. One answer was to create smaller lots backing on to
common areas with parks, lakes, swimming pools and other luxuries. This allowed the construction
of more housing units per acre without compromising the perceived quality of the neighbourhood.
Residents were able to enjoy services that they would not have been able to afford individually. Walls
and gates were built to limit access to these private amenities, and homeowner associations were
created to maintain the common areas and to preserve the appeal of the neighbourhood. 
Local governments in the United States encouraged the development of CIDs. As federal aid
to cities declined in the 1970’s, CIDs offered municipalities a cheap way to grow (Mackenzie 1994:
178). Private developers built private roads, installed sewer lines and built private parks at little cost
to the public purse, all the while increasing the tax base. The United States Federal Government was
a major booster in promoting the growth of CIDs. In the summer of 1963, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) reversed its position on CIDs, and insured mortgages in such developments for
the first time. That year the FHA also allowed, without the usual review or critical analysis, the Urban
Land Institute’s publication of a blueprint for the creation of CIDs, in the form of  a 400-page
document outlining how to create homeowner associations (Mackenzie 1994: 92).
The only voices of dissent came from academia. There was concern that such communities
would effectively constitute private governments, with policies to exclude those considered
undesirable.As Mackenzie notes, “Policies of exclusiveness are only thinly veiled as efforts to
‘maintain high standards,’ or ‘insure property values’ or provide a ‘private community’” (1994: 93).
Almost thirty years later, the predictions ring true. The number of American homeowner associations
4exploded from under 500 in 1963 to over 150,000 in 1992 (Mackenzie 1994: 10). In the latter year
alone, over 32 million Americans had retreated behind gates with other like-minded individuals
sharing a “common interest” in homogeneity and the protection of property values. 
Common Interest Developments Defined
What exactly are common interest developments? There is no one factor. Evan McKenzie lists
a number of defining characteristics in Privatopia. First of all, CIDs are private communities. Almost
all are gated with walls of varying height, although some have barbed wire fences. The gate, through
which all residents and visitors must pass, may be manned by a security guard, activated by a code
known only to residents, or opened simply by pushing a button. Some barriers serve a dual purpose.
At Desert Cove Estates in Vernon, British Columbia, the barbed wire fence serves to keep grazing
livestock away from the houses. In many places, the walls or fences are sufficiently high to serve as
security against invaders, while in others they are essentially cosmetic and serve as a psychological
barrier separating a community from the outside. 
Cosmetic walls that help to define “ lifestyle communities” (Blakely and Snyder 1997: 46) are
the most common in Canada. In Winnipeg, such symbolic markers can be found leading into Armstrong
Point, and along Waverley Street, at the entrance to Linden Woods. The walls help to create a private
country club atmosphere of exclusivity. “Prestige communities” use walls and gates to signal the
status and wealth of their residents. They often have “ostentatious entrances and showy facades,” along
with carefully landscaped grounds, to create an image of success (Blakely and Snyder 1997: 75).
Almost fifty percent of Americans earning over $100,000 consider living in an exclusive
neighbourhood to be a status symbol (Blakely and Snyder 1997: 76).
The walls and gates of “security zone communities” are built for protection. Residents of such
communities place a very high value on protection from real or perceived threats to security. There
are regular security patrols, and no one is allowed on the premises without authorization. These
communities have been described as “enclaves of fear” (Blakely and Snyder 1997: 99). This is the
least common pattern in Canada. All of the Canadian CIDs researched for this paper fit into the
categories of “lifestyle” or “prestige” communities.
Management of Common Interest Developments
Another defining feature of common interest developments is the presence of a homeowner
5association. Homeowner associations are generally composed of a board of directors, elected by the
homeowners. These boards enforce and amend the bylaws of the community, which were initially
drafted by the developers. In many respects, a homeowner association is de facto private government.
By owning a home within a CID, one automatically becomes a member of the association. All
homeowners are assessed a levy which pays for their share of the common property costs. The
associations exert a phenomenal amount of control over residents within, and in some cases even
beyond, their boundaries. In one notable case, the owner of a farmhouse in Pennsylvania was deemed
to be part of a homeowner association despite the fact that her purchase predated the development of
a CID beside her lot. Because her residence was officially part of the CID, the association levied
maintenance fees. When she refused to pay, the woman was fined. The association eventually obtained
a lien on her home and attempted to sell her cars (Mackenzie 1994: 17). This growing amount of
control is worrisome, particularly since in some American states such as California and Florida there
are increasingly fewer alternatives as CIDs are the most common form of new development
(Mackenzie 1994: 17).
There are a few variations to the model described above. Homeowner associations are not
always responsible for enforcing the bylaws and CC&Rs of the CID. In its land lease development,
Sandycove Acres advertises that:
...as management we handle the daily operations of the community and make the tough
management decisions that need to be made from time to time. It is our responsibility
to ensure the community retains a first class appearance. If that means we have to tell
your neighbour three doors down that he has to cut his lawn, then ... well that's our
problem, not yours. (Sandycove Acres Limited, n.d. a) 
In Sandycove Acres, the original developers still own the land and enforce the restrictive covenants.
Restrictive Covenants
Whether enforced by management or by the homeowner association, CIDs have restrictive
covenants and conditions which limit the range of what is permissible within their walls. Community
is defined by exclusion, strengthened by homogeneity and enforced by law. Such bylaws, or deed
restrictions, include a series of covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) on the use of land, and
are included in the deeds of each house. This allows the developers of the land to have a major voice
6in deciding how the land is used in perpetuity. The restrictions are tied to the land and may only be
changed by amending the bylaws (Mackenzie 1994: 20). American CIDs usually require a “super
majority” of either two-thirds or even three-quarters of eligible voters to amend a bylaw. Generally,
homeowners may vote while renters are disenfranchised (Mackenzie 1994: 127). Canadian CIDs are
hesitant to discuss their homeowner associations with outsiders, though it was revealed that
amendments generally have to be approved by the developers or management team (from conversation
with a representative of Desert Cove Estates).
The CC&Rs imposed on land use vary widely. Some CC&Rs are cosmetic, imposing
restrictions (i.e. architectural) and enforcing bylaws which euphemistically “preserve the integrity of
the community”. These restrictions vary by community and even between phases of construction within
a CID. Rancho Bernardo, a sprawling CID just north of San Diego, California, imposes many
restrictions. Gardens are frowned upon, but tolerated if not visible to neighbours. Fences, hedges and
walls may not exceed three feet in height and must be approved by the association. Trees must not be
taller than the roofs of houses, which must be covered in red tiles. Visits by grandchildren are limited.
In some of the wealthier neighbourhoods of Rancho Bernando, curtain colours are regulated. A CID
is no place for uniqueness. Difference is often a punishable offence.
 There is considerable, but by no means universal, support for restrictive CC&Rs among CID
residents. The restrictions are usually enforced by the homeowner association, though occasionally
by management. Fines are levied for non-compliance and there are numerous instances of court
challenges. Many residents undoubtedly find the restrictions comforting, while others find them
completely unreasonable. A case arose in Fort Lauderdale, Florida after the management of a CID
ordered a couple to stop entering and leaving by the back door. Managers were concerned that the
couple was leaving an unsightly path in the lawn by taking a shortcut. In response, the couple hired an
attorney who cited their right to use their own back door (Mackenzie 1994: 15).
Some restrictive covenants are dangerous. In Delaware County, Pennsylvania a homeowner
association took a man to court for building a four-foot fence of black fabric in his back yard. He had
built the fence to prevent his young son from falling off a 400-foot cliff (Mackenzie 1994:17).
A court ruled in the man’s favour.
Covenants are not necessarily the will of the community. Close to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
a family bought a metal swing set for their child. One year later, in spite of no written rules against
swing sets, the association ordered the family to take it down. New rules were written requiring that
7all swing sets be wooden. Three-quarters of the community signed a petition supporting the family,
and the family provided an Environmental Protection Agency document citing the dangers that
poisonous chemicals in pressure-treated swing sets posed to children. The association was unbending
and imposed a fine of $10 per day until the set was removed (Mackenzie 1994: 17). One neighbour
was quoted asking “Who are these little Hitlers making these rules?” (McCullough 1991).
Age Restrictions
The Canadian CIDs described in this paper are mostly adult communities with a minimum age
requirement for residency. In those communities, all residents must be at least 40 or 45 years old.
Children are not allowed to live there, but may come for short visits. Generally, visitors are not
allowed to stay for more than two weeks. These restrictions are strictly enforced. In researching this
paper, no evidence was found of court challenges to age restrictions in Canada. However, a
homeowner association in Monroe, New Jersey took a married couple to court because the 45-year-
old wife was three years short of the minimum age requirement. A court supported the association and
ordered the 60-year-old man to sell or rent his condo, or to live without his wife (McKenzie 1994:
15).
Discrimination
Some CC&Rs are inconvenient, some are dangerous, and others are explicitly discriminatory.
Early covenants in 19th-century America included racial restrictions. Private “street associations” in
St. Louis, Missouri included race restrictive covenants in their legal document dating back to the mid-
1800’s. Racially restrictive covenants were standard in projects in the late 1920s (McKenzie 1994:
9). Today, CC&Rs in Canadian CIDs are not explicitly racially discriminatory. However, there are
conditions and implicit barriers which exclude potential residents by age, income and class. High
housing prices and walls are two means of keeping undesirables out; CC&Rs are another. Euphemisms
such as “preserving the integrity of the community” serve to restrict membership in a CID by race or
class (McKenzie 1994: 78). In the 12-minute video advertising Sandycove Acres, the sense of
community was repeatedly highlighted. However, only white residents over the age of 55 were shown
(Sandycove Acres Limited, n.d. c).
Adult communities are by definition exclusive and discriminatory. Whether it is legal to
discriminate in this manner in Canada is unclear. Section 15. (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
8and Freedoms states that:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.
It is possible that a court or human rights tribunal might find an age restriction to be unconstitutional.
While all Canadian CIDs discussed here have age restrictions, none openly discriminated on the basis
of race or religion.
Housing Prices
The absence of explicit discrimination policies (other than the age restrictions) does not
suggest that housing prices, occupancy laws and other CC&Rs are not meant to narrow the range of
prospective homebuyers. Each CID has been created with a certain market in mind and the housing
prices reflect that target group. In Sandycove Acres, Ontario, trailers can be bought for as little as
$60,000. Close by, in the exclusive Avalon development, houses wired for the latest in Internet
technology cost considerably more. For the most part, housing prices in Canadian CIDs (not including
ownership of land) range between $120,000 and $170,000. Almost all target retirement-aged
Canadians, although Golden Beach Estates has recently added a development that targets families with
children. Additional monthly maintenance fees range between $170 and $500 (plus GST). Housing
costs may be lower in Canadian CIDs than in many of their American counterparts, but they are by no
means affordable to all. The average yearly income of elderly couples in Canada is $42,360; a retired
single male has an average income of $22,983, while a retired single female has an average income
of $19,552 (Statistics Canada, a). Most Canadian seniors may find it difficult to buy into Privatopia.
Key Differences between Canadian and US Common Interest Developments
In the United States, common interest developments have been built for a variety of
demographics. Some target families with young children, while others appeal to childless
professionals or retired couples. In Canada, the vast majority of the CIDs studied targeted retired and
near-retirement age couples without children living at home. That may be changing, however. Golden
Beach Estates, for instance, is no longer an adult-only community. Future CIDs in Canada may cater
9to a wider variety of prospective homebuyers than they do at present. 
Canadian CIDs are also considerably smaller than the largest American developments. Rancho
Bernardo and Leisure World, both in California, have tens of thousands of residents each. Sandycove
Acres, the biggest CID in Ontario, is home to almost 1,900 residents. Another major feature of
Canadian CIDs is the universal use of land leases. By buying a home in a Canadian CID, one leases
the land for life (or in the case of Rice Developments, for 20 years). Canadian CIDs may be too
expensive for some, but have lower up-front costs than if residents bought the land beneath their
homes. Canadian CIDs follow a pattern of leasing rather than selling land. 
Canadian Common Interest Developments
The following provides an overview of Canadian CIDs researched for this paper.
Blue Water Country
Blue Water Country in Sarnia, Ontario advertises itself as “Adult Leisure Living”. All of its
residents are over the age of 50, with well-understood limits on visits of children and grandchildren.
The 127 homes are part of a gated community where residents enter an access code to open the gates
at the main entrance. Residents own their homes but lease the land from Blue Water Country. Most
new house are built with two bedrooms and two bathrooms and cost between $123,900 and $132,900
for 1,100- to 1,300-square-foot bungalows (Blue Water Country, n.d.). The elected homeowner
association deals with residents’ complaints, brings concerns to management and can amend bylaws
drafted by the developers (Conversation with sales agent at Blue Water Country). There are also other
homeowner committees, such as a recreation committee that plans special events like barbeques,
picnics and dances.
Blue Water Country is responsible for snow removal, grass cutting, garbage removal three
times a week and interior road maintenance. The developers charge monthly rent of $220 to $250, plus
a $95 maintenance fee per month. This fee pays for the services mentioned above, for water and
sewage services provided by Sarnia, and for the upkeep of the Clubhouse. The Clubhouse, the pride
and joy of Blue Water Country, cost over $1 million to build. It contains an indoor pool, whirlpool,
games room, woodworking shop, crafts room, library, exercise room and a lounge area. There is also
a large hall that is used for dinners, dances, card nights and other events. Other outdoor facilities
include a barbeque area, horseshoes, shuffleboard and tennis courts, a whirlpool and a garden. These
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luxuries are the exclusive property of those living within the walls of Blue Water Country.
Desert Cove Estates
Desert Cove Estates is found in the Okanagan Valley (British Columbia), on the outskirts of
Vernon. Desert Cove is built on a First Nations Reserve, and has leased the land from the federal
government for 49 years. Along the highway is a 900-foot-long wall, and the rest of the development
is protected by barbed wire fence. Its gate can be opened simply by pushing a button, and the barbed
wire fence is intended primarily as a deterrent to roaming livestock and wildlife. Neither cattle nor
prospective buyers under the age of forty are welcome here. The minimum age requirement is strictly
enforced, although children may visit for up to two weeks. There are just under 160 homes, with a
capacity for up to 600 homes. The average house costs approximately $120,000 for a 1,500-square-
foot bungalow (All information drawn from a conversation with a representative of Desert Cove
Estates). Land is not included in the housing price, but is a life-lease.
Desert Cove Estates is organized similarly to Blue Water Country. There is an elected
homeowner association responsible for amending bylaws, as well as small improvements. The
association has recently built a small golf course, planted trees, and is continually planning special
events. Residents pay between $140 and $147 per month in rent. This sum includes maintenance of
the private roads, street lighting, water and garbage removal. All other utilities are paid separately.
The fee also includes upkeep of the recreation centre, which has a pool, hot tub, game room, lounge,
kitchen, library and crafts room. The community also has a volunteer fire department and one fire
engine. There are no stores as of yet. There are restrictive covenants, such as the requirement that
recreational vehicles not be parked in front of houses, but rather in the special parking lot beside the
recreation centre.
Rice Development
Rice Development, a family-owned firm dating back to 1918, specializes in building CIDs in
southern Ontario. Rice Development has created four CIDs to date, namely Wilmot Creek, Avalon,
Sandycove Acres and Golden Beach Estates. Each is an adult community designed for a certain target
market. No children are allowed in any of the four communities.
Wilmot Creek was built along 1.5 miles of Lake Ontario shoreline, east of Oshawa. It
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advertises its free golf course and proximity to Toronto. The development has six distinct types of
bungalows ranging from 1,080 square feet to 1,800 square feet. The houses cost between $110,000
and $170,000, and the land is leased. Included in the monthly rental fee are water and sewer, snow
removal, maintenance of common areas, a variety of outdoor and indoor activities, unlimited golfing,
and use of the 28,000-square-foot clubhouse. Other features of Wilmot Creek are a beauty salon, a
library, a Royal Bank and the walls that keep outsiders where they belong. 
Two of Rice Development’s communities have been built in the rapidly-growing area around
Barrie, Ontario. Situated between Toronto and the popular cottage area of Muskoka, the region is one
of the fastest-growing in Ontario. 
Avalon is the newest Rice Development community, and targets childless, near-retirement-age
professionals and entrepreneurs. It is a luxury development in a town with an average income six
percent (6%) below the Ontario average (Statistics Canada, b). The CID advertises its “state-of-the-
art Social and Recreation complex”, its Executive Business Centre catering to the self-employed, and
its “smart homes” wired for the latest information technology (Avalon Community, n.d.). It also has
a nine-hole golf course as well as all the standard luxuries found in Rice’s other CIDs. The houses,
which do not include the land, are considerably more expensive than the average homes in the area
(Statistics Canada, c).
Sandycove Acres is a less pricey alternative to Avalon. Ontario’s largest Adult Lifestyle
Community advertises its “affordable and comfortable homes” (Sandycove Acres Limited, n.d. b). The
houses are all bungalows or permanent trailer-like designs. Prices vary between $60,000 and
$130,000 for 720- to 1,500-square-foot homes. As in all other Rice Developments, the land is leased
and not owned by the homeowner. Monthly fees average $500 and municipal taxes are generally
between $500 and $1,000 (Sandycove Acres Limited, n.d. b) Sandycove Acres predates other Rice
communities and is unique in that it is not completely gated. A private security firm patrols the
development, but access is not restricted. The community has built private roads and parks along with
a restricted-access clubhouse. By not completely restricting access, Sandycove Acres includes more
public features than other CIDs. It has a post office, medical office, variety store and a bank branch.
The community does, however, have a homeowner association, restrictive covenants including a
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minimum age requirement for residency, and other common features of CIDs. All that is missing is the
gate.
Golden Beach Estates, built along Rice Lake in Southern Ontario, is the lone family-friendly
CID. It is made up of two separate developments. The first is targeted at retirees wanting to move to
Rice Lake, while the second is marketed as a four-season Family Recreational Resort. Golden Beach
Estates is located beside the decades-old Golden Beach Resort. The Estates are quite new, and the
only cottages for sale are new factory-built custom designs. The final cost depends on the features
desired, but prices start at $100,000. The Estates is a land lease community. For a monthly fee of
$350, cottage owners enjoy the privilege of private groomed trails and a playground, as well as
private roads, sewer and water services and common areas within the gated community. Residents of
Golden Beach Estates may also enjoy unlimited use of the nearby Golden Beach Resort. The resort
includes a marina, a pool and a variety of indoor and outdoor sports and activities. A clubhouse is
being planned (Golden Beach Estates Limited, n.d.). While residents of the Estates may enjoy the
amenities of the neighbouring resort, the amenities of the Golden Beach Estates remain the exclusive
domain of those who live there. 
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Common Interest Developments and the Canadian City
It is difficult to foresee exactly how CIDs will change Canadian cities and local politics. The
popularity and success of CIDs will likely be the deciding factor. As the population living within gates
and paying privately for municipal services grows, so too will their power. In the United States,
politicians are increasingly appealing to the CID constituency: “Every US president in the last four
elections campaigned in Leisure World [a Californian CID]…. That goes for senators and governors,
too…. They go to Leisure World rather than the cities” (McKenzie 1994: 194). The 20,000 voters in
Leisure World have the attention of candidates and their campaign teams. As one strategist put it, “In
California, the suburban voter is the common interest community voter” (McKenzie 1994: 195).
The 30 million Americans living in CIDs constitute a powerful political force in local politics.
Their interests are clearly defined and are effectively promoted by their elected homeowner
associations. The associations are a means of delivering thousands of votes to politicians savvy
enough to capture the imaginations of CID residents. Homeowner associations have boards that meet
regularly, have established means of passing information on to homeowners, and are experienced
lobbyists. Residents of CIDs are generally wealthier than the American average and their board
members come from a variety of professions (McKenzie 1994: 142 and 189). Homeowner
associations are filled with rich and powerful voices. In some areas, such as Boston, Massachusetts,
the presidents of homeowner associations have formed an organization to lobby for their collective
interests (McKenzie 1994: 192). It is completely understandable that a constituency which numbers
over 30 million should attempt to influence political decision making, and that politicians will listen.
The main problem is that the interests of CID residents are in some ways the polar opposites of those
of people living outside of their walls.
“Double taxation” and limiting growth in their vicinity are major issues for CID residents
(Mackenzie 1994: 193). This paper will not discuss the “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) politics of
CIDs. While NIMBY-ism is an important issue, residents of CIDs are not the only ones to oppose new
developments in their vicinity. Organized homeowner associations, however, may be more effective
in getting their positions heard at the planning level than other area residents. 
Of greater interest here is the issue of “double taxation”. Since CID residents pay levies to
their homeowner associations for snow removal, street repairs, garbage pickup and other services
usually provided by the municipality, they feel that they should not be charged municipal property
taxes for these services. Homeowner associations have brought the issues forward to city councils and
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state legislatures. How powerful are the lobbying efforts of homeowner associations? The state of
New Jersey has responded by requiring all cities to fully reimburse CIDs for services such as grass
cutting, snow removal, street lighting, recycling, and garbage pickup. If they do not pay, municipalities
must provide these services “in the same fashion as the municipality provides these services on public
roads and streets” (MacKenzie 1994: 195). This is not only true in New Jersey. Houston, Kansas City,
Montgomery County, and Maryland all rebate property taxes to residents of CIDs. 
How legitimate are the “double taxation” complaints of homeowner associations? There is a
concern by municipal officials that their solvency will be threatened by rebates to CIDs. There is also
the question of equity. Homeowner associations have argued that theirs is a campaign for fairness.
They have already paid for their services and should not have to pay twice. However, what goes
unsaid is that the residents made a choice to live in a private community. The roads, parks, swimming
pools, libraries, clubhouses and services that they enjoy are not available to the public. They are
private services which are privately consumed and should be paid for privately. They are not
available to the public and should not be used as tax-deductible expenses. On the other hand,
municipal services are public goods and are enjoyed by all. A neighbourhood’s roads are free for all
to use, as are its parks. After all, CID residents still drive on municipal roads and have the use of all
municipal services once they leave the gates of their development. Why should they not have to pay?
Individuals and couples choosing to live in CIDs have made a choice. They have chosen to
live in a private community, complete with restrictions and conditions on how they may live and what
they may do with their homes. They may do so for a number of reasons. They may prefer the sense of
togetherness that a private, restricted community offers. They may be fearful of crime, and are willing
to tolerate greater order at the price of individuality. They may enjoy the lifestyle, including the
country club, golf course and the chance to share hobbies with friends. They are free to make that
choice, but that should not allow them to opt out of the community outside their gates. 
Buying a home in a CID cannot excuse one from civic responsibilities. Residents of CIDs have
not traded one community for another. They may have chosen to become Sandycovers or to move to
Avalon, but every time they leave the gates they are still privy to all the benefits of the community
outside. They drive on the municipal streets, drink the water, enjoy the parks and benefit from fire and
police protection. However, individuals living outside of CIDs do not enjoy the added amenities that
these developments provide to their residents. Residents of neighbouring Innisfil may not enter the
gates of Avalon and stroll through its parks or use its Executive Business Centre. The difference
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between the exclusive enjoyment of private services and the universal access to public services is
why residents of CIDs should not be allowed to evade municipal taxes.
CIDs pose the problem, as Robert Reich has penned, of the “secession of the successful”. He
writes that in many American cities and towns “the wealthy have in effect withdrawn their dollars
from the support of public spaces and institutions shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own
private services” (Reich 1991: 42) If the Canadian middle class is given the chance to avoid paying
for public services, the quality of those services will deteriorate. What is now a slow trickle to CIDs
could well become a torrent as the middle class abandons existing neighbourhoods. Stripped of their
tax base, cities would become undesirable to the many, and the sole option of the poor. The secession
will be complete.
The problem with CIDs is not only financial but sociological. CIDs create a sense of
community built on exclusion. Private communities are defined by who is not allowed within the gates.
Housing prices, age restrictions and CC&Rs are all means of limiting membership. Someone, whether
young, poor or otherwise undesirable, is always unwelcome. What sort of society does that make us?
In the Tropic of Capricorn Henry Miller condemns Americans for having become exclusive and no
longer tolerant of differences: “If you dream something different you are not in America, of America,
American, but a Hottentot in Africa or a Kalmuck, or a chimpanzee. The moment you have a
“different” thought you cease to be an American” (1961: 57). CIDs are intolerant of difference and
of diversity. Is this what we want as Canadians?
Residents of CIDs are retreating behind walls and gates and occasionally refusing to pay for
municipal services. Such shirking of financial responsibility does not bode well for a shared sense
of responsibility in the greater community in which they live. Charles Murray writes: “I am trying to
envision what happens when 10 or 20 percent of the population has enough income to bypass the
social institutions it doesn’t like in ways that only the top fraction of one percent used to be able to”
(McKenzie 1994: 187). The vision is ominous. Urban decay in undesirable neighbourhoods will
intensify, and middle class residents will begin a slow exodus from older neighbourhoods. Many non-
gated neighbourhoods will develop characteristics of ghettoes, threatening the relative integrity and
safety of Canadian cities. Urban renewal projects will become increasingly difficult. If CID residents
refuse to pay for the roads outside their gates, why would they support other municipal projects such
as downtown rejuvenation or renewal efforts in a decayed neighbourhood? Canadians of means will
be behind protected walls, having abandoned the other neighbourhoods of their cities; a chiaroscuro
2 Sandycove Acres has 1,900 residents. Innisfil, which includes Sandycove, had just over 24,000
residents in 1996 (Statistics Canada, d).
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of gated prosperity right next to urban decay. Civic activists should take note. There is an inevitable
divergence between the interests of homeowner associations and the cities outside their walls.
Sandycove Acres, Ontario’s largest CID, is home to eight percent of the residents of the greater
Innisfil area.2 As Sandycove, and communities like it, grow, so too will their political power.
To date there appears to be a lack of concern at the municipal level with regard to CIDs. Every
Canadian CID examined was growing and selling new homes. The growing presence of CIDs in
Canada shows that a considerable number of municipalities are not overly concerned by the existence
of private communities within their boundaries. 
That is not to say that Canadian cities have universally embraced CIDs. At least one Canadian
municipality has blocked an attempt by developers to develop a gated community within its
boundaries. Discovery Ridge was being planned within the western limits of an area annexed by the
City of Calgary in 1995. The developer of Discovery Ridge wanted to put a guardhouse, but not gates,
at the sole entrance to the community. The city’s Planning Commission did not allow the guardhouse
to be built since it would imply private land and limited access to the public. The Planning
Commission’s position towards gated communities is that: 
(c)ommunities with public roads and public park space cannot be gated since the
public has a legal right to access these amenities and roadways. The only way an area
can be gated is if the development (usually just one cul-de-sac), is subdivided under
the Province of Alberta's Municipal Government Act as a Bareland Condominium.
Much like an apartment that is owned as a condo (share of the building), a Bareland
Condo would be private, that is even the roadway is private, the sewer pipes, and no
public parks. (Email correspondence with a representative of the City of Calgary)
This policy shows that the City of Calgary discourages the building of gates and walls around
developments that have public services (such as roads and parks). However, it could allow exceptions
in the case of a fully private community, even within its city limits. A city planner considers this to
be an “extremely unlikely” scenario, but not impossible (Email correspondence with a representative
of the City of Calgary). However, as we have seen, the scenario is not at all unlikely. Across North
America, CIDs are being built. Calgary’s policy allows for CIDs as long as they qualify as “bareland
condominiums”.
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Municipalities should be more cautious in allowing private communities within their borders.
In the short run, CIDs may appeal to planners. CIDs are planned and managed privately and pose
relatively few coordination problems for municipal officials (McKenzie 1994: 181). The private
developers build all the infrastructure within the gates. Moreover, the developments increase the tax
base at little cost to the city. In the longer term, they pose a greater threat than previously imagined.
They compete directly with the city for the most affluent of its citizens. If mobilized, a large CID
population may well extract costly concessions from municipal or provincial politicians as they have
done in the United States.
Sam Warner has written that “the successes and failures of American cities have depended
upon the unplanned outcomes of the private market” (Warner 1968). Common interest developments
are the major US housing phenomenon of our time. CIDs are the most common form of new
development in states such as California and Florida, and are found from New England to the Pacific
Coast (McKenzie 1994: 11). The question that we must ask ourselves as Canadians is whether we
want to follow the same path. While CIDs appeal to many individual homeowners, they also pose a
great threat to the health of our cities and communities.
This paper has critically examined the phenomenon of common interest developments from a
Canadian perspective. Canadian CIDs are generally smaller and newer than their American
counterparts. However, the targeted market for CIDs is widening in Canada. In select provinces,
senior citizens, business people near retirement age and families with children can find CIDs to meet
their needs and dreams. These dreams are built on exclusivity and exclusion. As new CIDs are built
and the market grows, city planners will come to realize the consequences. 
The interests of homeowner associations and the cities beyond the walls are divergent. The
cries of “double taxation” and talk of a tax revolt by the associations are likely inevitable as the
number of CIDs grows and their political power increase. Canadians, and especially municipal
officials, must strive to understand the reason for CIDs’ appeal and respond in a way that does not
threaten the integrity and health of the communities outside the gates. 
A clear line must be drawn on the issue of making homeowners’ fees tax deductible. Common
interest developments have met the needs of a housing market niche. This should not, however, allow
homeowners to secede from society. Life does not end at the gate, and residents of CIDs cannot be
allowed to evade responsibility. After all, we are not all Sandycovers.
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